This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player.
Introduction
This paper studies the reputation effect in the long-run interactions in which a longlived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the longlived player. In the canonical reputation models without exogenous learning (Fudenberg and Levine (1989) , Fudenberg and Levine (1992) ), the long-lived player can effectively build a reputation by mimicking the behavior of a commitment type because the short-lived player will play a best response to the commitment action in all but a finite number of periods after always seeing the commitment action. The underlying reason is the fact that the short-lived player cannot be surprised too many times: every time the short-lived player expects the commitment action with small probability and yet this action is actually chosen, the posterior belief on this commitment type jumps up, but at the same time the beliefs can not exceed unity.
However this "finite number of surprises" intuition does not carry over to the case with exogenous learning. It is still true that each surprise leads to a discrete jump of the posterior beliefs. But after a surprise during the periods of no surprises, the exogenous learning can drive down the posterior beliefs. After a long history without surprises, the posterior beliefs may return to the original level, resulting in another surprise. Typically, this can happen infinitely many times. Hence in the presence of exogenous learning, there is no guarantee that we have a finite number of surprises. Wiseman (2009) first presented an infinitely repeated chain store game example with perfect monitoring and exogenous signals taking two possible values. He shows that when the long-lived player is sufficiently patient and there is sufficient noise in the signals, the long-lived player can effectively build a reputation and assure himself of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax payoff. This paper extends Wiseman (2009) to more general reputation models with exogenous learning. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs to the long-lived player. The lower bound is characterized by the commitment action, discount factor, prior belief and how noisy the learning process is. For fixed commitment action and discount factor, the lower bound increases in both prior probability and noise in the exogenous signals. This is intuitive as a higher prior probability on the commitment type and a noisier and slower exogenous learning process both correspond to easier reputation building. When the long-lived player become sufficiently patient, the effect of the prior probability vanishes while that of the exogenous learning remains. This is again intuitive because the prior probability represents the cost of reputation building in the initial periods. When the long-lived player places arbitrarily high weight on future periods, the cost in the initial periods becomes negligible. In contrast, learning has a long run effect. The longer the history, the more the uninformed player can learn about the type of his opponent. Hence the effect of learning remains even if the long-lived player become sufficiently patient.
Not surprisingly, the lower bound we derive is generally lower than that if there is no exogenous learning, reflecting the negative effect of learning on reputation building.
In the case that signals are completely uninformative, these two bounds coincide.
Nonetheless, when the signals are sufficiently noisy, the lower bound shows that in any Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player is assured of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax value.
To derive the lower bound, we apply the relative entropy approach first introduced by Gossner (2011) to the study of reputations. Gossner (2011) uses this approach to the standard reputation game in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and obtains an explicit lower bound on all equilibrium payoffs. He also shows when the commitment types are sufficiently rich and the long-lived player is arbitrarily patient, the lower bound is exactly the Stackelberg payoff which confirms the result in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) . Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012) applied this method to the reputation game in which the type of the long-lived player is governed by an underlying stochastic process. They calculate explicit lower bounds for all equilibrium payoffs at the beginning of the game and all continuation payoffs. In these two papers, relative entropy only serves as a measure of prediction errors. However, in this paper, in addition to a measure of prediction errors, the concept of relative entropy is also naturally adapted to the learning situation as a measure of noise in the exogenous signals. This again makes relative entropy as a more suitable tool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the reputation model with exogenous learning and introduce relative entropy. Section 3 presents and discusses the main result, which is proved in Section 4.
Model

Reputation game with exogenous learning
We consider the canonical reputation model (Mailath and Samuelson (2006) , Chapter 15) in which a fixed stage game is infinitely repeated. The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move finite game of private monitoring. Denote by A i the finite set of actions for player i in the stage game. Actions in the stage game are imperfectly observed. At the end of each period, player i only observes a private signal z i drawn from a finite set Z i . If an action profile a ∈ A 1 × A 2 ≡ A is chosen, the signal vector
The marginal distribution of player i's private signals over Z i is denoted by π i ( · |a).
Both π( · |a) and π i ( · |a) have obvious extensions π( · |α) and π i ( · |α) respectively to mixed action profiles. Player i's ex-post stage game payoff from his action a i and private signal z i is given by u * i (a i , z i ). Player i's ex ante stage game payoff from action profile
Notice this setting includes as special cases the perfect monitoring environment (Fudenberg and Levine (1989) ) in which Z 1 = Z 2 = A and π(z 1 , z 2 |a) = 1 if and only if z 1 = z 2 = a, and the public monitoring environment (Fudenberg and Levine (1992) ) in which Z 1 = Z 2 and π(z 1 , z 2 |a) > 0 implies z 1 = z 2 . Player 1 is a long-lived player with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) while player 2 is a sequence of short-lived players each of whom only lives for one period. In any period t, the long-lived player 1 observes both his own previous actions and private signals, but the current generation of the short-lived player 2 only observes previous private signals of his predecessors.
There is uncertainty about the type of player 1. Let Ξ ≡ {ξ 0 } ∪Ξ be the set of all possible types of player 1. ξ 0 is the normal type of player 1. His payoff in the repeated game is the average discounted sum of stage game payoffs (1 − δ) t≥0 δ t u 1 (a t ). Each ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ denotes a simple commitment type who plays the stage game (mixed) actionα 1 ∈ ∆(A 1 ) in every period independent of histories. AssumeΞ is either finite or countable. The type of player 1 is unknown to player 2. Let µ ∈ ∆(Ξ) be player 2's prior belief about player 1's type, with full support.
At period t = −1, nature selects a type ξ ∈ Ξ of player 1 according to the initial distribution µ. Player 2 does not observe the type of player 1. However, we assume that the uninformed player 2 has access to an exogenous channel which gradually reveals the true type of player 1. More specifically, conditional on the type ξ, a stochastic process {η t (ξ)} t≥0 generates a signal y t ∈ Y after every period's play, where Y is a finite set of all possible signals. To distinguish the signals z ∈ Z generated from each period's play and the signals y ∈ Y generated by {η t (ξ)} t≥0 ,
we call the former endogenous signals and the latter exogenous signals. In addition to observing previous endogenous signals, each generation of player 2 also observes all the exogenous signals from earlier periods. We assume that for each type ξ ∈ Ξ, the stochastic process {η t (ξ)} t≥0 is independent and identically distributed across t.
1 For a finite set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of all probability distributions over X.
Conditional on ξ, the distribution of the exogenous signals in every period is denoted by ρ( · |ξ) ∈ ∆(Y ). Notice this assumes that the realization of the exogenous signals are independent of the play, hence it models the exogenous learning of the uninformed player 2.
For expositional convenience, we assume player 1 does not observe the exogenous signals. This assumption is not crucial for our result. The same lower bound will apply if we assume player 1 also observes the exogenous signals. A private history of player 1 in period t consists of his previous actions and endogenous signals, denoted
with the usual notation
H 10 = {∅}. A behavior strategy for player 1 is a map
with the restriction that for all ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ,
A private history of player 2 in period t contains both previous endogenous and exogenous signals, denoted by h
with H 20 = {∅}. A behavior strategy for player 2 is a map
Denote by Σ i the strategy space of player i.
Any strategy profile σ ≡ (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 × Σ 2 , together with the prior µ and the signal distributions {π( · |a)} a∈A and {ρ( · |ξ)} ξ∈Ξ , induces a probability measure P σ over the set of states Ω ≡ Ξ×(A 1 ×A 2 ×Z 1 ×Z 2 ×Y ) ∞ . The measure P σ describes how the uninformed player 2 expects play to evolve. Let P σ be the conditional probability of P σ given the event that player 1 is the normal type. The measure P σ describes how play evolves if player 1 is the normal type. We use
the expectation with respect to the probability measure P σ (resp., P σ ).
A Nash equilibrium in this reputation game is a pair of mutual best responses.
Condition (a) states that given σ * 2 , the normal type of player 1 maximizes his expected lifetime utility. Condition (b) requires that given σ * 1 , player 2 updates his belief via Bayes' rule along the path of play and plays a myopic best response since he is short lived.
Relative entropy
The relative entropy between two probability distributions P and Q over a finite set X is the expected log likelihood ratio
with the usual convention that 0 log Relative entropy measures the speed of the learning process of the uninformed player 2. For each commitment type ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ, let λ ξ(α 1 ) be the relative entropy of the exogenous signal distributions when player 1 is the normal type and when he is the commitment type ξ(α 1 ), i.e.
Relative entropy measures how different the two distributions ρ( · |ξ 0 ) and ρ( · |ξ(α 1 ))
are. In terms of learning, λ ξ(α 1 ) measures how fast player 2 can learn from exogenous signals that player 1 is not the commitment type ξ(α 1 ) when player 1 is indeed the normal type. The larger λ ξ(α 1 ) is, the faster the learning process is. This is illustrated by the two polar cases. If λ ξ(α 1 ) = 0, then the distributions of the exogenous signals when player 1 is the normal type and when he is of type ξ(α 1 ) are identical. In this case, from the exogenous signals, player 2 can never distinguish the normal type from the commitment type ξ(α 1 ) when player 1 is the normal type. If λ ξ(α 1 ) = ∞, there must be some signal y ∈ Y which will occur when player 1 is the normal type but will not occur when player 1 is the commitment type ξ(α 1 ). Hence in this case, player 2 will learn that player 1 is not the commitment type ξ(α 1 ) for sure in finite time when player 1 is the normal type. For other intermediate values 0
conditional on the normal type, player 2 will eventually know that player 1 is not the commitment type ξ(α 1 ).
The following assumption rules out extremely fast learning. Technically, it requires that the support of ρ( · |ξ) be contained in the support of ρ( · |ξ(α 1 )) for every commitment type ξ(α 1 ).
Relative entropy measures the error in player 2's one step ahead prediction on the endogenous signals. Gossner (2011) first introduced the following notion of ε-entropyconfirming best response (see also Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson (2012) ):
Definition 2. The mixed action α 2 ∈ ∆(A 2 ) is an ε-entropy-confirming best response
The set of all ε-entropy confirming best responses to α 1 is denoted by B ε (α 1 ).
The idea of ε-entropy-confirming best response is similar to ε-confirming best response defined in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) . If player 2 plays a myopic best response α 2 to his belief that player 1 plays the action α 1 , then player 2 believes that his endogenous signals realize according to the distribution π 2 ( · |α 1 , α 2 ). If the true action taken by player 1 is α 1 instead of α 1 , then the true distribution of player 2's endogenous signals is indeed π 2 ( · |α 1 , α 2 ). Hence player 2's one step ahead prediction error on his endogenous signals is, measured by relative entropy,
The mixed action α 2 is an -entropy-confirming best response of α 1 if the prediction error is no greater than .
For any commitment type ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ, let
be the lowest possible payoff to player 1 if he playsα 1 while player 2 plays an ε-entropy-confirming best response toα 1 . Let V ξ(α 1 ) ( · ) be the pointwise supremum of all convex functions below V ξ(α 1 ) . Clearly V ξ(α 1 ) is convex and nonincreasing.
Main result
For any δ ∈ (0, 1), let U 1 (δ) denote the infimum of all Nash equilibrium payoffs to the normal type of player 1 if the discount factor is δ. Our main result is the following: Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, for all δ ∈ (0, 1),
To understand the equilibrium lower bound in Proposition 1, it suffices to consider the reputation building on each ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ since the overall lower bound is obtained by considering all possible commitment types. Fix a commitment type ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ.
Proposition 1 states that in any Nash equilibrium, the normal type of player 1 is assured of a payoff no less than
is a nonincreasing function. For fixed δ, this lower bound increases with µ(ξ(α 1 )) while decreases with λ ξ(α 1 ) . The intuition is straightforward. A larger prior probability on the commitment type ξ(α 1 ) makes it easier for the normal type of player 1 to build a reputation on this commitment type. In another word, the cost of reputation building in the initial periods is smaller in this case which leads to a higher lower bound. However the learning process goes against reputation building because player 2 eventually learns that player 1 is not the commitment type ξ(α 1 ). It is then intuitive that the speed of learning matters. If the exogenous signals are sufficiently noisy, then λ ξ(α 1 ) is small and it is hard for player 2 to distinguish the normal type and the commitment type. This results in a rather slow learning process and hence a high lower bound. If the learning process is completely uninformative, λ ξ(α 1 ) = 0, then the lower bound is given by V ξ(α 1 ) − (1 − δ) log µ(ξ(α 1 )) which is exactly the same lower bound derived in Gossner (2011) without exogenous learning. In general, when λ ξ(α 1 ) > 0, the lower bound is lower than that in Gossner (2011) due to the learning effect.
Another parameter in the lower bound is player 1's discount factor δ. An interesting feature in the lower bound is that δ only appears as a coefficient for the term log µ(ξ(α 1 )), not for λ ξ(α 1 ) . This is because − log µ(ξ(α 1 )) captures the cost of reputation building in the initial periods while λ ξ(α 1 ) is the learning effect which remains active as the game evolves. As a result, when player 1 becomes arbitrarily patient, δ → 1, the cost of reputation building in the initial periods becomes negligible since player 1 places higher and higher weight on the payoff obtained in later periods, whereas the learning effect remains unchanged. In this case, the lower bound becomes V ξ(α 1 ) λ ξ(α 1 ) . 2 Moreover, in the presence of multiple commitment types, which commitment type is the most favorable is now ambiguous. Intuitively, this is because the effectiveness of reputation building does not only depend on the 2 Since V ξ(α1) (ε) is convex, it is continuous at every ε > 0.
stage game payoff from the commitment type but also on the learning process. Even if player 2 assigns positive probability on the Stackelberg action, committing to the Stackelberg action may not help player 1 effectively build a reputation because the exogenous signals may reveal quickly to player 2 that player 1 is not the Stackelberg commitment type. This is in a sharp contrast with the result in standard models without exogenous learning.
We use the following example which is first considered in Wiseman (2009) to illustrate the lower bound obtained in Proposition 1.
Example. There is a long-lived incumbent, player 1, facing a sequence of short-lived entrants, player 2. In every period, the entrant chooses between entering (E) and staying out (S) while the incumbent decides whether to fight (F ) or accommodate (A). The stage game payoff is given in Figure 1 , where a > 1 and b > 0. 
Now we apply Proposition 1 in this setting. Because monitoring is perfect, it is easy to see B ε (F ) = {S} when ε < log b+1 b
. Therefore, we have
Proposition 1 then implies for all δ ∈ (0, 1)
and in the limit
Wiseman (2009) Although it is not surprising that exogenous learning affects reputation building, why does it take this particular form, i.e. the relative entropy of the exogenous signals?
As mentioned previously, the "finite number of surprises" argument in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) does not apply because of the downward pressure on posterior beliefs due to exogenous learning. In this particular example, the uninformed entrants may enter infinitely many times even if he is always fought after any entry. Moreover, receiving the signal y always decreases the posterior beliefs (recall ρ(y|ξ 0 ) > ρ(y|ξ(F ))) which is the source of the downward pressure. Thus the strength of this downward pressure depends exactly on how frequently the entrants can receive the signal y which, together with the size of surprise, in turn determines how long it takes for the posterior beliefs to return after a surprise. In other words, the size of surprise and the relative frequency of exogenous signals together determine the frequency of entries.
If it takes a long time for the posterior beliefs to return, then the entrants can not enter too frequently and the incumbent can effectively build a reputation.
To see this, fix any Nash equilibrium σ. For any history h ∞ in which F is always played, let {µ t } t≥0 be player 2's posterior belief on the commitment type along this history. Player 2 is willing to enter in period t only if
So, if player 2 enters in period t, we must have
and
We examine the odds ratio {µ t /(1 − µ t )} t≥0 along this history. Since the entrant is always fought along this history, the odds ratio evolves as
where for y ∈ {y, y}, 1 y is the indicator function, 1 y (y t ) = 1 if y t = y and 0 otherwise.
Because σ 1 (ξ, h t )(F ) is always less than or equal to 1, we have
if player 2 stays out in period t. Because inequality (3) holds if player 2 enters in period t, we have
if he enters in period t. For any t ≥ 1, let n E (t), n y (t) be the number of entries and the number of signal y's respectively in history h t . Inequalities (4), (5) and simple induction imply
Moreover, if player 2 enters in period t, inequality (2) implies
Hence inequalities (6) and (7) together yield
for all t at which player 2 enters. Let {t k } k≥0 be the sequence of periods in which entry occurs. By taking log and dividing both sides by t k , inequality (8) implies
, because lim t n y (t)/t = β by law of large numbers. Because for every t ≥ 1, there exists k ≥ 0 such that t k ≤ t < t k+1 and n E (t)/t = n E (t k )/t ≤ n E (t k )/t k , the above inequality also holds for the whole sequence lim sup
This inequality states exactly what we have mentioned above: the fraction of entries along a typical history is determined by the size of surprise b+1 b
and the relative frequency of the exogenous signals λ ξ(F ) . Lastly, because this inequality holds for all Nash equilibria, we have
This is exactly the lower bound in (1).
Proof of Proposition 1
One important property of relative entropy is the chain rule. Let P and Q be two distributions over the product X × Y (see for example Cover and Thomas (2006) Chapter 2 and Gossner (2011)). The chain rule states that the relative entropy of P and Q can be expanded as the sum of a relative entropy and a conditional relative entropy:
where P X (resp., Q X ) is the marginal distribution of P (resp., Q) over X and P ( · |x) (resp., Q( · |x)) is the conditional probability of P (resp., Q) over Y given x.
Fix a commitment type ξ(α 1 ) ∈Ξ. Suppose σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reputation game with exogenous learning. Let P σ be the probability measure
∞ induced by σ, µ and {ρ( · |ξ)} ξ∈Ξ , as in section 2. Let P σ be the conditional probability of P σ given the event that player 1 is the commitment type ξ(α 1 ). The measure P σ determines how the play evolves if player 1 is of type ξ(α 1 ).
Let σ 1 ∈ Σ 1 be the strategy for player 1 in which the normal type of player 1 mimics the behavior of the commitment type ξ(α 1 ), i.e. σ 1 (ξ 0 , h t 1 ) =α 1 for all h t 1 ∈ t≥0 H 1t . Let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ). The probability measure P σ (recall from section 2,
describes how the normal type of player 1 expects the play to evolve if he deviates to the commitment strategy of ξ(α 1 ). The only difference between P σ and P σ is the distributions of player 2's exogenous signals.
Because we assume the realizations of player 2's exogenous signals only depend on the type of player 1 and are independent of the play, for all
where y 0 , y 1 , · · · , y t−1 are the exogenous signals contained in the history h t . Notice by Assumption 1, ρ(y|ξ(α 1 )) > 0 whenever ρ(y|ξ 0 ) > 0. Hence the right hand side of the above equality is well defined.
Let P σ 2 , P σ 2 and P σ 2 be the marginal distributions of P σ , P σ and P σ respectively on player 2's histories (Z 2 × Y ) ∞ , and let {P σ 2t } t≥1 , { P σ 2t } t≥1 and { P σ 2t } t≥1 be the corresponding finite dimensional distributions. In period −1 before the play, player 2 believes that P σ 2t is the distributions of his signals (both endogenous and exogenous) in the first t periods. However, if player 1 is the normal type and he deviates to the commitment strategy of ξ(α 1 ), P σ 2t is the true distribution of player 2's signals in the first t periods. The following lemma gives an upper bound on the prediction errors in player 2's first t periods signals.
Proof. We show this by a simple calculation:
.
Notice the second term is the relative entropy of the distributions on player 2's exogenous signals in the first t periods when player 1 is the normal type and when he is the commitment type ξ(α 1 ). Because the exogenous signals are conditionally independent across time, the chain rule implies the second term is exactly tλ ξ(α 1 ) .
Moreover, since P σ 2t is obtained by conditioning P σ 2t on the event that player 1 is the commitment type ξ(α 1 ), we have
Therefore the first term is no greater than − log µ(θ). These two observations imply the desired result.
For any private history h t 2 ∈ t≥0 H 2t , P σ 2,t+1 (resp., P σ 2,t+1 ) induces player 2's one step ahead prediction on his endogenous signals z
3 In the equilibrium, at the information set h t 2 , player 2 believes that his endogenous signals will realize according to p 3 If h t 2 has probability 0 under P σ , i.e. it is not reached in the equilibrium σ, then the one step ahead prediction is not well defined. But this does not matter because we will consider the average (over h t 2 ) one step prediction errors.
For any
[ · ] denote the expectation over H 2t with respect to the probability measure P σ 2t . The following lemma is a direct application of the chain rule.
Lemma 2. For all t ≥ 0, where the first inequality comes from Lemma 2 and the second inequality from Lemma
1.
An important feature of Lemma 3 is that the upper bound on the expected prediction error is independent of P σ and P σ , which allows us to bound player 1's payoff in any Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1. In equilibrium, at any information set h t 2 ∈ t≥0 H 2t that is reached with positive probability, σ 2 (h t 2 ) is a best response to E σ 1 (ξ, h 4 Because σ is a Nash equilibrium, the deviation is not profitable. Hence in equilibrium, the payoff to the normal type is at least as high as
≥ V ξ(α 1 ) − (1 − δ) log µ ξ(α 1 ) + λ ξ(α 1 ) ,
4 Because P σ is absolutely continuous with respect to P σ .
